We Can Feed the World / No We Can’t / No We Won’t

There are, and have been for a few decades now, competing narratives about food, hunger, and population. And supporting these narratives are a large number of divergent arguments from people with an even larger array of ideological perspectives. I’ve been puzzled for some time that these narratives not only have co-existed for as long as they have, but that it’s still unclear which is true, and more than that, which of the supporting arguments make sense and which don’t isn’t clear.

Below I’d like to attempt to break these narratives into three (oversimplified) categories and highlight a few recent and not-so-recent arguments supporting them.

We Can Feed the World, part 1.
This argument comes in a number of forms. The first, most obvious, and most prominent one is that of the agribusiness world, which says and has said for decades that new chemistry and new genetic engineering can and will continue increasing yield. The claim they often make is stronger than this, saying that only such agribusiness science and engineering can increase yields and feed the world, and that without them people will starve. (Scientific American had a recent issue dedicated to this, and it was, frankly, a bit embarrassing to see such a magazine be so narrow in what science they considered in making their judgments.)

However, often ignored in this perspective is the fact that a billion people around the world are going hungry already, and many more are food insecure. Many farmers who have switched to using these agribusiness methods have found themselves struggling to pay for them. They have also found that the techniques, when they work at all, have little staying power: artificial fertilizers only provide a boost for so long before already-depleted soil is stripped of structure, other nutrients, and soil life and can no longer produce high yields; GMO, pesticide, and herbicide manufacturers struggle to keep pace with natural adaptations against their methods. So while it’s true these systems are feeding the world, it’s not clear they can continue to.

We Can Feed the World, part 2.
A less common but still prominent argument made by Lappe and others in books such as Diet for a Small Planet and Hope’s Edge, is that scarcity of food is a matter of proper distribution of food and/or income, and a matter of not wasting food via the present-day industrial food system. That is, there is enough food being grown to feed the world, but that instead of going to feed the world, this plant-based food is either used as animal feed for heavy meat eaters in wealthy nations, is used in the production of highly-processed industrial food, or is simply wasted.

This argument is based upon a slightly shaky premise. Even if the world were short, say, enough food for 1 billion people, and there were no waste in the current food system, there are probably enough other sources of calories that could be turned to that are outside of the human economy — that is, plants and animals that are currently not viewed as food but could be. That’s not to say that it’s preferable to increase the human footprint on the planet, but rather that the argument is premised on the footprint we have today and that footprint isn’t fixed.

Turning this reasoning on its head, we find that the argument that we can feed the planet using the food that’s grown today, with today’s footprint, doesn’t squarely face the fact that humanity has already far overshot carrying capacity and has appropriated far too many ecosystems for its use. That is, for this argument to hold — making the big assumption that the economic systems that make today’s food system exist were to be radically altered — we’d need to be able to replace all of the food growing going on across the globe in a way that puts it on a sustainable footing. Maybe this is possible, and Lappe and others give plenty of examples of how it can be done better on a small scale, but as I’ll discuss later, a large question is whether we will, not whether we can.

No We Can’t, part 1.
There are some in the mainstream of this discussion who are nevertheless pessimistic about food availability. In this camp I’ve seen arguments for decreasing the birth rate in poor nations (primarily) as they view the problem as a matter of population, and that energy/resource footprints aren’t an issue in the discussion. I’ve never found mainstream “no we can’t” arguments to be particularly well thought out, as they’re often used as a bludgeon to make a political point (e.g. “people in country X are hungry not because globalization destroyed their local economic and agricultural systems but because they have too many people, and we can’t fix that”).

No We Can’t, part 2.
Many eminent, less-mainstream thinkers fall into a second category of “no we can’t feed the world” thinking, including Meadows, Catton, Diamond, and others who take a large-scale, long-term ecological view of the predicament humanity is in today. They argue that all societies and all systems that overshoot their ecological basis a) are eventually forced to return to within that basis, b) often degrade the basis itself by being in overshoot, and that c) this process happens so slowly (over many human generations) that it’s easy for these societies to believe that they have agency, d) no past societies have been able to avoid this consequence and there is little reason to believe that now is different, and e) no one subsystem (e.g. food, manufacturing, etc.) is independent and thus all subsystems rise and fall together.

Surprisingly even mainstream commentators like Thomas Friedman have gotten in on this kind of argument, though of course after making the argument that we’re in overshoot, he manages to ignore its fundamental conclusion and instead argues that we’ll find a way out.

No We Won’t, part 1.
Last year Adam wrote a nice analysis of a Toby Hemenway article on the resilience of the food system. He made the case that while Hemenway’s arguments on how the industrial food system might continue to function and feed humanity (even while fossil fuels become more expensive and scarce) make sense in the way Lappe’s arguments make sense, there’s reason to be concerned that market conditions and public policy will make entrenched actors in the food system slow to adapt to changing conditions. Thus it’s likely that people will continue to fall off the back of the truck as things decline. Beyond simply the monetary incentive to continue growing crops for non-food uses, there is also significant inertia and sunk costs in the system that are likely to make change difficult. I find myself in agreement with this part of the argument: “I’m optimistic about the proliferation of kitchen gardens in urban and suburban spaces, but transforming land currently zoned for industrial monoculture is a much more daunting task.” I’d like to consider where this leaves us next.

Energetic limits of land productivity.
To understand what sorts of physical limits might exist on food production, I did a quick calculation. While I’m sure there are many better estimates out there, this should give us a rough idea of whether it’s even reasonable to imagine that 7 billion or more humans can be fed sustainably. Let’s start with an estimate of 200 W/m^2 of sunlight, globally averaged over night and day, arriving at the Earth’s surface. Average photosynthetic efficiency is about 1-2% for normal plants (only some algae and a few rare plants like sugarcane get higher efficiency). So that’s 2-4 W/m^2 of plant energy assuming the ground is entirely covered. Then let’s allow 50% for the plant to perform its own metabolic functions, so that’s 1-2 W/m^2 of harvestable energy. Given that a person requires 100 W (about 2000 kcal / day), that results in 50-100 m^2 of land requirement per person, which is about 500-1000 sq ft, which happens to be about what David Duhon and John Jeavons found is the minimum land area on which one can feed oneself growing and eating mostly potatoes in a perfectly-managed, intensively-cultivated smallholding.

So no new technology is needed, nor is new technology possible, to improve the efficiency with which we can produce food. That is, the arguments made by those in the first camp — those who argue we must increase yields through new techniques in industrial agriculture — are bunk, as techniques have already been developed to deliver the maximal yield possible given the sunshine falling on the Earth. Literally the only way out of this (energetically), I think, is to build nuclear fusion plants and then use the energy from that to produce food somehow — that’s the only possible renewable non-solar source of energy — but this remains firmly in the realm of science fiction.

However, when we look at the amount of farmland under cultivation today, we see that it’s far more than is required to feed all of humanity ten times over if such intensive cultivation were used — perhaps 500 billion people (as my friend John pointed out). The catch, I think, is twofold.

The first catch is that we must consider total human energy consumption rather than simply what humans require to stay alive. In the absence of fossil fuels, this energy will come in large part from plant sources. To begin with, intensive cultivation requires cycling back all nutrients perfectly to keep it within 100 m^2. Otherwise it requires about 3x the land area, with the remainder used for compost crops and letting the land rest (with 3x being a rule of thumb I’ve seen in a number of sustainable agricultural methods). This ignores the water cycle and other limits for simplicity. Average energy consumption globally today is 2kW / person (16 TW / 7 billion = 2285 W). So that means we need to roughly scale down the arable land by a factor of 20 (to get the portion used for just food), and that’s with perfect nutrient cycling. Take a factor of 3 on that for compost crops, and we’re at 8 billion people living at 2kW. If we had no other impact on the planet and could do perfect sustainable organic agriculture with most people living in lower-latitude temperate and tropical regions we could sustain 8 billion people on the planet.

A couple big flaws in this estimate is that a large fraction of arable land is used to feed animals for meat, and that the 2kW used per person often involves taking the products of nature and processing them, thereby consuming an outsized portion of nature relative to that energy budget (e.g. it takes much less energy to cut down a tree than it took the tree to grow). The first could be fixed by saying that we could sustain 8 billion people on a perfectly managed vegan organic diet, and with meat, somewhere between 2-4 billion. Even this ignores the possibility of getting some of the 2kW / person from photovoltaics and wind turbines. Nevertheless, the crux of this calculation is that sustainable techniques exist to produce roughly as much food as the industrial food system produces today, but also roughly as much as is possible given energetic limits.

The second catch is the one Adam identified — converting backyard gardens is one thing, but turning the farmed-out land of the American Midwest into Jeavons-style smallholdings is another thing altogether.

Premises and Conclusions.
It’s a bit odd to end on both premises and conclusions, but there are a couple of premises that are unstated in this discussion that span the categories. Specifically, this discussion is premised on the notions that feeding the people of the world is a) good and b) hard to do either now or in the future. I think both of these are true, but I’ve seen arguments that b) isn’t fundamentally true. Neoprimitivists tend to make this argument, among others: that the world is naturally abundant and that as long as societies remain uncivilized (i.e. not living in cities with high resource consumption) then the Earth will provide with little effort. Whether this was true in the distant past, it’s certainly not applicable now and won’t be for many centuries.

Pulling these strands of thought together it seems to me that there’s good evidence all these perspectives are right, but on different timescales. We have a core industrial food system that can and will feed most of (but, crucially, not all of) the world in roughly the ways it is today, with feedback loops that will keep it stable. These feedbacks include the entrenched food distribution system, political lobbying of industrial farmers and agribusiness that want to keep subsidies flowing to keep their business models viable as long as possible, and the eating habits of the world. However since this system is not on a solid foundation, it will slowly (and, perhaps in short bursts, quickly) leak people and land into the two other categories — “no we can’t” and “no we won’t” — in which people go hungry due to lack of food or because the system is imbalanced and prioritizes other things over feeding people. I do think that, like Adam wrote, that kitchen gardens are likely to pick up some of the slack and my calculations indicate that quite a lot of food can be grown that way. However, in the long run, we’re unlikely to escape the ecological fate of so many past societies; our task is make the ride down as smooth as possible.

Observations and Questions

For some time I’ve been accumulating observations and questions on a variety of topics but have felt the need to have, for the former, deep analysis, and for the latter, answers. I don’t have much in the way of either, but I’d like to share them nevertheless.

Cause and Effect.

Is technological progress driving prosperity, or is prosperity driving technological progress? The conventional answer is the former, as argued by authors such as Diamandis but certainly by many others. However it’s likely that the latter is actually the dominant cause and effect relationship, with a bit of the former (making it a feedback loop).

This may be the central assumption that differs between those who expect business as usual (in technological progress at least) to continue in some form and those that don’t. That is those who expect technological progress, but who are having a hard time denying the material limits to growth, still claim that such progress can proceed unimpeded. (Kurzweil likes to point out that even the Great Depression didn’t affect technological progress.) But without a prosperous underlying society — that relies upon the mining of nonrenewable natural, social, cultural, and spiritual capital, to use Eisenstein’s phrasing — would this technological progress really continue? It seems we are going to find out the answer to this question over the next decade.

Poor Substitutes.
We’ve had nominal economic growth for a long time, but if we are to look at what’s happened, we’ve been substituting the rich with the cheap and real with the fake. One of the core reasons for this transition is that our appetites haven’t been decreasing but there are more and more people around the world entering their respective middle classes, expecting the materially-wealthy life that’s supposed to come with it.

In food: Fake olive oil, fake honey, fake sugar (in the form of artificial sweeteners — consider that at least 10 alternative sweeteners are used commonly today, including Aspartame, Saccharin, Sucralose, Stevia, Acesulfame potassium, Neotame, Xylitol, Mogroside, Thaumatin, and Isomalt).

In material goods: objects are made of thinner, less sturdy materials.

In news: the format of conventional newspapers and TV news programs hasn’t changed much in the last couple of decades, but far less is going on behind the scenes to really investigate the world as budgets are cut. The same quality of news coverage can’t be done with a team of journalists a fraction the size of what was needed before.

In energy sources: this one is well known, but for completeness — we’re substituting dense, easy to extract, relatively cleaner energy sources with diffuse, hard to extract, and/or dirtier ones.

In relationships: many people can claim many more “friends” today than they could before, since they are in regular contact with a much larger group of people via social networks and the like. However, it seems unlikely that the quality of the interactions with any of those people is improved due to streamlined communication channels.

Ecosystems of Bureaucracies and Cities.

We might do a thought experiment, in which types of individuals are like types of plants or animals that move into an ecosystem / thrive in an ecosystem in different stages. Here we might consider two contexts: institutional bureaucracies and city cultures.

The radicals, innovators, crazy types are like pioneer weeds in an institution. The same goes for hipsters in cities. They forge new ground, go where others aren’t willing to, and get things ready for others to move in. However their will or interest in holding that ground wanes, and they move on to wide open spaces.

Yuppies, and their equivalents in institutions, move in later. While they contribute a little bit of creativity, innovate around the edges, they are mostly seeking stability.

It seems that there is a stable state that ecosystems reach that is rarely reached by either bureaucracies or cities. Instead, these human creations decline rather than arriving at the analogue to an old-growth forest. (Would it be a culture/community that has weathered hundreds or thousands of years in more or less the same form, one that is in balance with the world around it?)

Cataloging Euphemisms.

Our daily speech is filled with euphemisms but we don’t often work to correct them. Some of the euphemisms I’ve noticed recently that are relevant to the topic of this blog include:

Fish stocks — fish.

Harvesting — makes little sense when applied to companies, jobs, etc.

Oil production — no oil is being produced, as it was produced a long time ago.

Seeds as “infringing articles”, “copies” — the language of intellectual property does not fit biological reality.

Automobile — it doesn’t move on its own.

Public relations — is it possible to have an honest conversation with an anonymous group such as the “public”? (And what of the fact that the foundation of public relations is the work of Edward Bernays, whose book Public Relations (1945) was preceded by his book Propaganda (1928)?)

Breaking the Linear / Cyclical Duality.

Lots of authors argue that modern industrial society (and the world around it) undergoes a linear process of change (using linear to mean “in one direction”). Other say no, the processes are cyclical. Of course things are more complex than this, as interacting webs of cycles are layered on top of each other, with linear processes also playing a part, and other processes that are neither (chaotic). We might consider a few of them.

Biogeochemical cycles: ocean current conveyors of various durations, ENSO and other oscillations, Earth’s tilt and the ice age cycle, etc.

Civilization cycles: Kondratieff waves, anacyclosis, Strauss-Howe generational theory, Hindu Yugas, and short-term cycles like the business cycle.

Linear processes: entropy, solar insolation, Earth’s radiation of energy into space

Models that take into account multiple cycles, or better still a combination of multiple cycles along with linear or one-way processes can yield better results — consider multi-cyclic Hubbert analysis, such as the graph in this post by Tad Patzek on U.S. oil production.

Uneconomic Combustion.

Herman Daly introduced the idea of uneconomic growth many years ago. Have we entered the period of uneconomic combustion? Say you have X billion dollars to spend today as a large company or government, and you decide to spend it on extracting and burning some oil or coal. And say that that combustion then translates into some fractional increase in ppm of CO2, which increases the temperature curve over the coming decades and thereby increases the costs borne by society.

Where does the curve cross over? That is, today, how much growth (and thus wealth for some definition of wealth) does X billion dollars buy you vs. how much it might have bought in decades past? And have we reached a point where even in pure dollars and cents terms — setting aside human considerations — that digging up and burning more fossil fuels loses us money as a society? Is the problem that in economic terms people “discount the future”?

Algae Greenwashing.

Algae-based biodiesel, the renewable fuel miracle that has had a bright future ahead of it for at least a couple of decades, has gotten some good press recently. But the narrative in the media is, as you’d expect, very misleading. Let’s take this article in the Chronicle and deconstruct it.

Big oil took a small but significant hit Tuesday when Bay Area motorists began filling up their gas tanks with algae, becoming the first private citizens in the world to use a domestically grown product that could revolutionize the fuel industry.

It seems unlikely that big oil took any hit at all — really all that happened is that the companies making small quantities of algae-based biofuel got some good public relations (i.e. propaganda, if we’re avoiding euphemisms) in the paper.

The fuel, which is actually 20 percent algae and 80 percent petroleum, is available to any vehicle that runs on diesel, and it spews much less smog and ozone-depleting greenhouse gases, Horton said.

First of all, most gasoline in the U.S. is 90 percent petroleum and 10 percent ethanol, so most drivers could make a claim that they’re using fuel that is as much a biofuel. Second, notice that while taking about greenhouse gases, the topic is switched to “smog and ozone-depleting” gases, which, while a concern, is not the primary concern in the mind of most readers about greenhouse gases. Maybe they phrased it this way because in sum the algae fuel (in its life cycle) actually produces more climate-impacting greenhouse gases than petroleum-derived diesel?

Pesticide Greenwashing.

Things that are supposed to be green but aren’t, like algae-based fuel, aren’t the only sources of greenwashing. Pesticide makers (from what I can tell, primarily Bayer and Syngenta, though they hide their involvement carefully) have been running misleading ad campaigns to get people to visit their new website ApplyResponsibly.org where they talk about the importance of being “responsible” in the use of pesticides (but of course starting from the premise that they must be used in the first place, and can of course be used in a safe manner). The site, and corresponding ad campaign, may be the result of a deal that the chemical industry made to avoid penalties / regulation.

Is EROEI a useful concept?

The concept of Energy Returned on Energy Invested is common in peak oil analyses — tar sands, for instance, get far less energy back for the energy that goes in than a conventional, on-land oil well. At a macro level — society-wide — it’s probably a useful concept due to factors such as White’s law.

However, I’ve come to the conclusion that EROEI is probably not that meaningful for any individual technology or fuel. First, most often EROEI calculations omit some part of the energy input analysis, or only follow the chain back so far, yielding inaccurate or non-comparable results. Second, energy arbitrage is useful for some time (even when we might frown on it) — we have that going on today in many forms, including methane into biofuels via fertilizers, methane plus tar sands into oil, and coal into photovoltaics and wind turbines (due to factories in Asia). It’s due to these factors that it seems EROEI should be avoided when focusing on any one particular energy source.

Heavy Metal.

A few years ago, a younger relative asked me a basic question: how’d mercury get in fish? I explained the sources and how industrial society has dispersed it, how natural processes caused the mercury to be bioaccumulated, etc. Since fish comprise the largest sector of food that humans largely don’t cultivate directly but catch in the wild (relative to other meats or produce), this problem is somewhat beyond remediation. That is, we can stop the pollution, but it may be a long time before we stop seeing mercury in fish.

However, we do have some control over land. So here’s a basic question I’ve had for a while: how do I remove lead from soil? How do I remove other contaminants from soil? In urban areas, especially those with houses / buildings over a few decades old, lead-based paint has slowly entered the soil. Land near roadways also accumulated lead from leaded fuels. Arsenic was once used as a pesticide, and it remains in some places. And the list goes on: chromium, selenium, PCBs.

Beyond simply physically digging up and hauling out soil, it seemed there must be better options. There are some biological approaches that use hyperaccumulators, including sunflowers and some types of mushrooms. (Of course these would then have to be taken somewhere not used for growing food.) There are also chemical options, which rely upon reactions to deactivate contaminants; one of the most promising I’ve seen is based on distributing ground up fish bones.

The Metaphor of Braess’s Paradox.

I mentioned in post last year the idea of Braess’s Paradox. The crux is that it’s possible in a network — road or computer or any other kind of network — to increase the capacity of the network but decrease its throughput. That is, by adding something, say lanes to a highway, it’s possible to actually slow down traffic.

While the paradox is interesting on its own, I didn’t want to explore it directly as much as consider the broader question of situations in which we have to sacrifice something (or at least feel as though we’re sacrificing something) for some longer term or other sort of gain, a gain that may be counter-intuitive or even hidden. Murphy’s Energy Trap and a similar observations by Meadows (in the context of global dynamics in Limits to Growth and lags in the global system that tend to lead to overshoot and decline) come to mind.

Are there old philosophical arguments about the nature of short-term sacrifice / long-term gain or changing the perspective one uses to realize that it’s not really sacrifice? And similarly, are there old parables and fables that convey similar ideas? While in the particulars Baess’s Paradox is new, the overall concept seems like a very old one.

An Ecological-Economic Shock.

It’s been said for a long time by many (as we asked Herman Daly about), that until there’s an ecologically-rooted economic shock, we may not collective shift our thinking in fundamental ways to move away from an infinite growth-based economic system. What if the need for such a shock is deeper than that — something akin to the idea underlying annealing? That is, we are stuck in a local maximum, one that is far from other potential maxima.

The question here is multi-part. First, what is the opposite of, in Naomi Klein’s terminology, disaster capitalism? The opposite isn’t moderated capitalism — that’s what we have every once in a while right now, and the system is oscillating between the two states of regular and disaster capitalism. Whatever the opposite is — and I’m not sure what it would look like — if it were to be the normal operating mode for some time it might allow for things to renormalize to some more sane midpoint. Second, what might cause such a shock, at what scale, and what impacts would it have? Third, what would the upsides and downsides be? What would be the timescale of these effects?

Taleb has argued that trying to predict when such a shock might happen is futile. So the case would be to prepare for the impact in advance, and in doing so improve the resilience of families, communities, and society overall. Is the overwhelming threat of a shock sufficient to cause action? Would the shock be self-fulfilling in such a case? (For example, some argue that the more people know about peak oil, the worse the effects will be as hoarding, speculation, and the like run wild.) Will the shock coincide with a recession, or will it look like something completely different?

The Decline of Falsifiability

Recently there has been much discussion and debate on the revelations of government surveillance programs. While I think the specifics of those revelations, and the debate around them, are interesting in themselves, I think the manner in which the debate is happening points to a deeper issue that our society is facing that I haven’t seen addressed: the decline of falsifiability.

Bruce Schneier asked recently what it would take before we believe what companies say about their cooperation in government surveillance programs. This same question can be asked in many other contexts, but let’s start with the one he asked it in.

The key difficulty here is falsifiability, or rather the lack of it. The surveillance programs the companies may or may not be involved in are secret. The application of publicly-passed laws relies upon a secret interpretation of those laws, presented before a secret court. Most members of congress (e.g., those outside of the Gang of Eight), who vote on the budgets for these secret programs and for the laws that are used before the secret court, are not fully aware of the programs or their use. And when these secret interpretations of laws are applied in secret programs to conduct surveillance, those who are ordered by the secret court to comply must themselves keep their involvement secret.

Thus our national security laws have moved us to a non-falsifiable world. That is, a government official may claim that these policies have “made us safer” or a company spokesperson can deny involvement in the programs, and it is essentially impossible for us to determine whether their statements are true or false (or more broadly to know the extent of the surveillance programs: who is involved, how, and what they’re doing). The key aspect to falsifiability is not that we care about something being true or false, right or wrong, but rather that we care that something can be shown to be true or false, right or wrong (or even some shade of gray). That gives us confidence that we can use evidence to guide our decisions and change course. When no evidence can be presented one way or the other, we exit the realm of the falsifiable.

One of the strengths of science is that is rooted not in fact, as it’s often described, but in falsifiability. (Obviously a lot has been written on this before; Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is of course worth reading to understand potential pitfalls.) Without falsifiability, we end up in a pseudoscience or faith-based world — faith not in the specific sense of religion, but more broadly in the sense of belief in the absence of seen evidence.

So the decline of falsifiability is clearly seen in this first category: the non-falsifiable.

One reason, I think, that modern representative democracies generally embrace science not just for understanding the world but also as a process of reasoning about policy is that it allows for issues to be resolved relatively cleanly. Debates do not need to be had ad nauseum without resolution because evidence can be presented to help resolve them. Without a process built upon falsifiability, we encourage two problematic ways of thinking about problems (that are mostly but not completely independent): conspiracy theory and ideology. Most conspiracy theories are non-falsifiable: they hinge on some set of assertions for which there exists no hypothetical evidence that can be used to disprove the theory. Most ideologies rely upon faith regardless of evidence that disproves part or all of the ideology.

A large fraction of debates appear to fall into this second and growing category: the falsifiability-irrelevant.

These are things that are falsifiable, but a presentation of evidence causes no shift in societal views. That is, they are driven by ideology. Trickle-down and austerity economics, and anthropogenic climate change are examples of this. In the former case, the evidence indicates it is a flawed theory but its adherents don’t care; more recently, a core pillar of austerity economics (as implemented in current policy) was debunked but to little effect among its proponents. In the latter case a large body of evidence indicates that it is a sound theory and yet its detractors don’t care.

A little over a decade ago, Carl Sagan warned about the prevalence of pseudoscience, and attempted to make a statement about what differentiates a society based upon science from one based upon pseudoscience. It was an important argument about the importance of falsifiability from an important scientist. (It’s a shame that Sagan didn’t think to put his own technological utopian beliefs under the same microscope as many of the other beliefs he skewered.) However, one of the key points Sagan made is that the decline in scientific thinking is a major issue not because pseudoscience is on the rise — as he argued, probably correctly, it’s been with us and will always be with us. Rather the danger is that we live in a society with greater technological power than ever before — power to shape the entire global ecosystem — and shouldn’t wield that power without a greater understanding of science.

The two categories above — the non-falsifiable and the falsifiability-irrelevant — together contribute to a growing issue: the non-discreditable. We see that many ideologies cannot be permanently discredited. Similarly, individuals can safely hold just about any viewpoint on many issues, either because they can’t be proven wrong or nobody cares even if they are; thus we see many pundits, thinkers, and political leaders who can’t be discredited in the eyes of the media. No matter what they say or do, their viewpoints are considered legitimate and need no supporting evidence. When contrary evidence is presented, it is quickly swept under the rug. That is, ideology trumps everything.

To return to the surveillance example, James Clapper (now Director of National Intelligence) is just one example of many — he led a team that made huge mistakes in the leadup to the Iraq war, and now he’s having to “correct the record” on statements he made to congress. In both cases his statements were in line with ideology, if not with reality. Many of his other statements are simply non-falsifiable. The list of such individuals and ideas in modern American life is long, and you can find them in both the public and private sectors.

While we should evaluate each statement on its own merits, reputation matters: what someone has said in the past affects how we judge their current thinking. When we find out that certain people who argued that smoking does not contribute to cancer are now arguing that carbon dioxide does not contribute to climate change, their past position certainly seems relevant, and it seems that they should be discredited in the eyes of the public. But they aren’t.

We may now be in a time with the largest fraction of the world’s human population living in capitalist representative democracies, and despite the fact that these societies are rooted in some sense in scientific decision-making, we find that they are unable to confront the grand problems they face — climate change, resource depletion, and ecological overshoot — due to the decline of falsifiability and the rise of unshakable ideology.

Many ancient societies were ruled by claims of divine right; royal proclamations were not falsifiable. Post-Magna Carta England was more responsive, for example, than other old societies, but not as much so as today’s England. But we don’t have to look to the distant past to see what it looks like for dogma to trump reason. A few decades ago Vaclav Havel wrote in The Power of the Powerless, in the context of Soviet Czechoslovakia, a warning well worth heeding:

Ideology is a specious way of relating to the world. It offers human beings the illusion of an identity, of dignity, and of morality while making it easier for them to part with them. As the repository of something suprapersonal and objective, it enables people to deceive their conscience and conceal their true position and their inglorious modus vivendi, both from the world and from themselves. It is a very pragmatic but, at the same time, an apparently dignified way of legitimizing what is above, below, and on either side. It is directed toward people and toward God. It is a veil behind which human beings can hide their own fallen existence, their trivialization, and their adaptation to the status quo. It is an excuse that everyone can use, from the greengrocer, who conceals his fear of losing his job behind an alleged interest in the unification of the workers of the world, to the highest functionary, whose interest in staying in power can be cloaked in phrases about service to the working class. The primary excusatory function of ideology, therefore, is to provide people, both as victims and pillars of the post-totalitarian system, with the illusion that the system is in harmony with the human order and the order of the universe…

…Yet, as we have seen, ideology becomes at the same time an increasingly important component of power, a pillar providing it with both excusatory legitimacy and an inner coherence. As this aspect grows in importance, and as it gradually loses touch with reality, it acquires a peculiar but very real strength. It becomes reality itself, albeit a reality altogether self-contained, one that on certain levels (chiefly inside the power structure) may have even greater weight than reality as such. Increasingly, the virtuosity of the ritual becomes more important than the reality hidden behind it. The significance of phenomena no longer derives from the phenomena themselves, but from their locus as concepts in the ideological context. Reality does not shape theory, but rather the reverse. Thus power gradually draws closer to ideology than it does to reality; it draws its strength from theory and becomes entirely dependent on it. This inevitably leads, of course, to a paradoxical result: rather than theory, or rather ideology, serving power, power begins to serve ideology. It is as though ideology had appropriated power from power, as though it had become dictator itself. It then appears that theory itself, ritual itself, ideology itself, makes decisions that affect people, and not the other way around.

Go Directly to Defeatism, Do Not Stop at Responses

About a year ago I mentioned that it seemed likely that in the next few years we’d see a transition from climate denial to climate defeatism or worse climate engineering:

I imagine that a number of those who previously denied that climate change was a problem will quickly shift to “it’s too late to do anything about it” or, among those who never miss an opportunity, “we have to geoengineer our way out of this problem.”

Apparently we now have the leading edge of exactly this shift in thinking, from none other than Exxon CEO Rex Tillerson, saying, among other things:

What good is it to save the planet if humanity suffers? … We do not see a viable pathway with any known technology today to achieve the 350 outcome that is not devastating to economies, societies and peoples’ health and well-being around the world. So the real question is, do you want to keep arguing about that and pursuing something that cannot be achieved at costs that will be detrimental? Or do you want to talk about what’s the path we should be on and how do we mitigate and prepare for the consequences as they present themselves?

Let’s deconstruct his first statement, which is remarkably similar to Hirsch’s comment that “While the environment is important, humans are more important.” that I discussed before. Both stem from a fundamental assumption of conventional macroeconomics: that the human economy is separate from the natural economy. Thus, in Tillerson’s mind, these two economies are locked in a zero-sum game, in which to help the natural economy is to hurt the human economy, and thus to “save” nature is to make humanity suffer.

It’s only been a year since he first acknowledged that climate change is real but not a big deal, and yet he’s already moved on from that stance to defeatism (“we do not see a viable pathway with any known technology today”) but doesn’t fail to seize an opportunity (“how do we mitigate and prepare for the consequences as they present themselves?”). Note that the pathways that he considers require technology, though he doesn’t think any are viable. I assume viable pathways in his mind are those that enable the pursuit of short-term economic growth and bottom-line profits for companies like his and technology involves the sort of large-scale machinery that Exxon has a fondness for. (Unfortunately defeatism leading to opportunism is not just the province of former climate change deniers like Tillerson, as this brilliant Radio Ecoshock episode details.)

Now that a captain of the fossil fuel industry has made the party line clear, I expect to start hearing the same from his allies in congress and various think tanks who’ve, up till now, been denying that climate change is real and human-caused. I expect that they too will ignore non-technological responses, including many of the things we like to write about here, such as the Clean Energy Dividend, planting trees, eating a more local and low-emergy vegetarian diet, cycling, and more. There are no large technological fixes among this suite of responses, and only one large-scale policy response.

So it seems we can soon add the titans of the fossil fuel industry to the groups engaged in uni-directional thinking in the context of the succinct description of Contraposition that Adam wrote two years ago.

Geoengineering vs. Terraforming

After listening to this recent Radio Ecoshock episode on geoengineering, which covered the unsurprising and yet still horrifying plans afoot to attempt to mask climate change through increasingly desperate means, I realized that the very distinction between geoengineering and terraforming I had been looking for was right there in front of me: in the words themselves.

Terraforming is “land shaping”. Geoengineering is “Earth engineering”. Thus while terraforming is restricted to the land surface of the planet, geoengineering concerns itself with anything and everything on the planet.

Broadly, we might say that the planet consists of land, air, and sea. Except for Antarctica, to a first approximation every bit of land on the planet is known and is under some nation’s jurisdiction. While something similar exists for air over land — a nation’s sovereign airspace — the vertical limit of sovereign airspace is unclear. And the vast majority of the sea consists of international waters and the air above it is effectively ungoverned.

The distinction between “land shaping” and “Earth engineering” is a crucial because of the commons. In most countries there is little land that isn’t owned by someone. Even land that we might broadly consider part of the commons — national parks, for example — are owned by the government, and visitors are expected to follow certain strict rules. (Well, unless we’re talking about BLM land and corporations engaged in fracking for gas.)

The air and sea are another matter entirely. Many of the major pollutants global society has dealt with in recent decades — CFCs, SO2, CO2, CH4 — are diffuse and envelop the globe. These pollutants are in the air largely due to, in the convoluted terminology of environmental regulation, nonpoint source emissions (that is, sources that are too small to track individually or point fingers at). Thus, they are being dumped into the commons — shared air and waters. Less often do we hear about open dumping of waste by party X on party Y’s land, and I think that’s because many nations have laws that strongly protect private property. Air and waters are less protected, and globally-shared air and oceans are less protected still.

That brings us to the danger of geoengineering. By not limiting its scope to the land, its purveyors can lay claim to the unregulated global commons of air and sea and don’t have to worry about what anyone else (or any laws) have to say about their plans. And if you look at many of the proposed geoengineering techniques, you’ll find that they invariably involve doing something in the stratosphere or in the ocean — consider proposals to spray sulfate aerosols in the stratosphere, dump iron in the ocean, and whiten clouds. It’s exactly these sorts of techniques that are most dangerous, in that they can be done unilaterally by a nation or even by a consortium of corporate and/or private interests (who are forming alliances, as Clive Hamilton discusses in the episode linked above, with oil companies), who are unlikely to fully weigh the consequences of attempting to mask climate change rather than addressing the root cause.

Life on Concrete

A few weeks ago there was a mouse in the street. Upon a closer look, it seemed like it was confused or injured, running in circles. The road was busy with cars and I almost jumped out into traffic to try to usher the mouse to the sidewalk, but was prevented from doing so (maybe for the best, I don’t know). In any case, some time later when we came back, it was clear the mouse had been killed by a car.

In the last year or two I’ve taken on a behavior that baffles me at the moment I’m acting it out. I find myself along some piece of concrete in the city — a sidewalk, a curb, a street — and I see some other fellow inhabitant of the Earth there, and I want to ensure that they can continue to live as I do, free from harm.

After a heavy rain, the sidewalks everywhere are writhing with earthworms, trying to get out of the water-logged heavy clay soils and into someplace more habitable. Unfortunately, that’s not the sidewalk. Here too I’ve found myself, even when with others, almost automatically finding a leaf or a stick to scoop up the worms and return them to a patch of soil that’s safer.

It’s not just a mouse or earthworms — I’ve found myself doing this for squirrels, birds, ladybugs, and others. One of the more traumatic was the case of a bird that flew into our apartment window a couple of years ago — I heard a noise and saw a small bird (a sparrow, maybe) on the ground next to the window. I gently picked the bird up and could see the bird struggling to breathe, making what looked like gasping motions. The bird’s feathers were soft and body slight. I wanted to let the bird have a chance of recovery if that were even possible, and found a secluded spot under the deck for the bird to rest. Unfortunately, when I returned a few hours later, the bird had perished, and I found a good final resting place in a snow bank.

I know I’m inconsistent about it, in that I readily pick off caterpillars from plants I’m growing and leave them for birds to catch, and I’m not sure if that’s any different from letting some other being die on the pavement — I’m sure there are ethicists who have thought about this question far more deeply than I have. And this inconsistency is probably nothing new to those who live on farms.

But when I see plants scratching out an existence in the cracks of some forgotten piece of sidewalk or an abandoned lot, it gives me an odd sense of happiness — life finding a way despite our best efforts. Same goes for crows that manage to find something to eat in industrial office parks. Maybe what’s driving my impulse is something like the inverse of the phenomenon I mentioned in a previous post where techno-fix solutions are seemingly judged by the immensity of their struggle against nature. I suppose I see helping those other animals around us, in the decidedly human environment of city concrete, as honoring their role in the world around us.

Economy << Ecosystem

Today it hit me that the model of the economy and the ecosystem in ecological economics is more right than I had previously understood. The work of Herman Daly and others made sense before today, with its key premise that the human economy is a subset of the ecosystem. This is something neoclassical economists, not to mention environmental economists, tend to ignore or deny.

What I didn’t realize before, though, is this: not only is the global economic system a subset of the global ecosystem, but it is an ecosystem even though we don’t think of it that way. An ecosystem roughly speaking involves energy flows between biological, geological, and chemical entities and processes. That’s what an economy consists of as well — flows of energy, food, minerals, water, and then derived goods that are built upon those foundations. A bird gathering twigs that were produced by a tree to build a house is no different than a human gathering lumber from the hardware store that was produced by a tree to build a house. The term economy could apply in both contexts, and so the distinction between the two is a false one. While non-humans, to our knowledge, don’t use currencies to mediate their exchanges, they use a vast array of mechanisms to interact and exchange energy and resources with each other; consider the symbiosis that takes place among coral or in any mycorrhizal association, to pick two among millions of examples.

Once this linguistic substitution is made, the false premises of conventional economics are more apparent. For example, imagine reading a recent news headline while applying this substitution:

China’s ecosystem growth slows to 7.7%

The absurdity of it is immediately apparent when framed that way: the only way for China’s economic ecosystem (or any type of ecosystem for that matter) to grow is to expand its boundaries — that is, to appropriate flows from outside its current boundaries. Thus we can return to Daly’s dictum with confidence:

[T]he economy is an open subsystem of a finite and nongrowing ecosystem (the environment). The economy lives by importing low-entropy matter-energy (raw materials) and exporting high-entropy matter-energy (waste). Any subsystem of a finite nongrowing system must itself at some point also become nongrowing.

Networking for Undeveloping Regions

I wrote the short position paper below, with a bit of help from a colleague, for an academic audience, but never published it. Today I was thinking about it and realized that it synthesizes some of my thinking on computing and economic trends. For the last decade there has been an active area of computing research sometimes called ICTD (Information and Communication Technologies for Development) or Developing Regions computing research, largely focused on bringing to bear computing to solve the problems of industrializing nations. For the moment I’d like to set aside both the problems with the term “development” and the fact that much of such work is unlikely to succeed in the ways its proponents think it will (Toyama’s take on this is well worth reading, and is a good counterpoint to the much more mainstream ideas of the One Laptop Per Child project, among others). Nevertheless, some of the research that’s been done has been worthwhile in that it’s been forced to work within limits, both energy and financial, but many in this field aren’t that familiar with the broader issues of Limits to Growth. That’s where this paper begins.

1. Introduction

A simple view of the world’s nations yields a comforting binary: developed nations, those that have industrialized, and developing nations, those aspiring to their example. It is in this context, for the most part, that work on development in general and ICTD in particular has operated, and by and large this has been a success and a boon to those in developing nations. In this paper, we complicate this view by adding a third, heretofore unexamined category—undeveloping regions—and discuss both the need to consider ICT broadly and networking in particular in this new context.

Recent studies indicate that energy costs will rise substantially in the coming years, due primarily to the increasing difficulty of locating and extracting fossil fuels [10, 17]. Rising energy costs, increasing demands [3], ecological limits [13], and economic consequences [7] will force a fundamental change in the world’s economies, and yet due to the scale of the challenge and the lack of preparation for a transition, the effects are expected to be significant; a 2005 study commissioned by the U.S. Department of Energy concluded [10]:

“Virtually certain are increases in inflation and unemployment, declines in the output of goods and services, and a degradation of living standards. Without timely mitigation, the long-run impact on the developed economies will almost certainly be extremely damaging, while many developing nations will likely be even worse off.”

Thus the world is on a collision course: already-high resource consumption/environmental impacts in developed nations and increasing in developing ones collide with resource limits and broader ecological overshoot. We can loosely define undeveloping regions as largely today’s high socioeconomic regions that as a result of these challenges are likely, in some form or another, to face degradation of their social and economic systems. In this we also include a second somewhat distinct category: currently developing regions whose industrialization is likely to slow, stall, or reverse. In Section 2 we attempt to identify the contours of such regions in order to inform research directions.

Given these challenges, how might ICTD researchers respond? We are outsiders to the ICTD community, and as such this paper is both a challenge and a plea to the community: a challenge to consider how these new global challenges will affect the context in which ICTD work is done and a request for help from the ICTD community to apply the hard-won knowledge of today’s ICTD to these soon-to-be undeveloping regions that comprise both today’s developed world and the developing world. In these new environments, both the target objectives and the constraints are likely to be different from the environments seen today. For example, research objectives in undeveloping regions are likely to focus lower on Maslow’s hierarchy, on more prosaic but more fundamental human needs, just as ICTD work has done in developing regions, than does today’s developed-world networking research. Similarly, the environments of undeveloping regions are likely to have different infrastructure availability and financial constraints, finance and culture, than seen anywhere today. In particular, today’s developed nations often lack indigenous cultures of self-sufficiency (in large part because they were supplanted long ago) and as a result are likely to prove to be as challenge rich environments as ICTD is today.

Thus we are both proposing a new direction for research in both the ICTD community and the broader networking community, and hoping to outline the circumstances and challenges that will help inform future designs in this space; we discuss these in detail in Section 3. In particular, we contend that the goals of Appropriate Technology are ones aligned with the needs of undeveloping regions, and that using networked systems to help decrease complexity and increase transparency of socioeconomic systems will be of particular value.

Finally, there remains a sensitive topic to discuss: why those in the ICTD community should be interested in the challenges to be faced by currently-developed regions; after all, the latter have significant resources to address their own problems. A natural response would be to ignore these challenges, expecting the fates of undeveloping regions to be separate from today’s developing regions. On the contrary, however, as these challenges progress, it is likely that the circumstances and fates of those in currently-developed and currently-developing regions will increasingly be shared, as suggested by a number of analyses [10, 13, 9, 14]. It is for this reason that we do not attempt to artificially separate the two, and consider both categories within the moniker “undeveloping regions.” Beyond this matter of shared fate, we also believe that the community has significant knowledge to contribute to a shared vision of what networking and ICT can look like in this common future.

2. Case Studies

Before we attempt to define undeveloping regions, we first look at two related questions: what is the nature of near-term global challenges, and how might those challenges manifest in terms that help us identify appropriate ICTD-like responses?

For the first, we briefly summarize previous work on the subject detailing the contours of the challenges ahead. For the second, in the absence of true ethnography detailing life in undeveloping regions (since we are, after all, discussing future circumstances whose specifics are unknowable today), we must consider a substitute. As such, we examine four recent historical instances in which crises befell nations. We do this in an attempt to glean common characteristics that might inform the challenges that lay ahead, not to predict any specific crisis or circumstance. Our examples lay somewhat along a spectrum from isolated and monolithic problems to pervasive and broad-based problems: Argentina experienced a financial crisis, Greece a financial crisis along with endemic economic problems, the United States two temporary oil crises, and the Soviet Union systemic collapse.

2.1. Background In a recent paper, we described the challenges that networking will broadly face as energy and ecological limits are reached, most likely some time this decade. Specifically, we discuss energy limits—oil production in particular—why alternatives are unlikely to serve as adequate substitutes in the required timeframe, and the likely economic consequences. As a result, developed and developing nations alike are likely to face widespread economic and social challenges over at least the span of decades. We refer interested readers to a number of works on the broader topic [12, 13, 9, 14] for additional details.

In short, the impending challenges are not just due to the limits of oil production, but the panoply of issues faced by global society today. Among these are climate change [13], stagnant food production per capita, and broad ecological overshoot [20]. In addition, rapid development has put developed and developing nations on a collision course: if India and China were to maintain their current rate of growth for a little over a decade, together they would consume 100% of the crude oil available on the global market (i.e. of global net exports), even under the optimistic assumption of stable global oil production [3].

2.2. Argentina The case of Argentina, once seen as a development success story, is fraught with geopolitical intrigue but little actual complexity of cause or effect. Blustein provides a comprehensive analysis of the economic crises that befell Argentina, in part of its own doing, and in part due to actions by organizations such as the IMF [1]. While the cause of the challenges faced by Argentina largely differ from those described above, the societal issues faced may be instructive. Blustein describes how the impact of the financial crisis affected all social classes, the consumer economy, and the food system. Transportation systems, such as Argentina’s rail system, suffered. Despite this, perhaps due to the relatively short duration of the worst of the crisis, public health may have remained largely unaffected.

2.3. Greece The crisis currently unfolding in Greece today has similar roots as that of Argentina a decade earlier, though it bears greater similarity to the challenges we’re likely to face. As a recent report found [19]:

By many indicators, Greece is devolving into something unprecedented in modern Western experience. A quarter of all Greek companies have gone out of business since 2009, and half of all small businesses in the country say they are unable to meet payroll. The suicide rate increased by 40 percent in the first half of 2011. A barter economy has sprung up, as people try to work around a broken financial system.

At the same time, many Greeks are returning to agriculture, and the health system is struggling to meet even basic needs [5]. In some ways, the challenges Greece faces are harder to overcome than those of today’s developing nations, as few alternative systems—of food, finance, or health care—exist for the populace to fall back upon. While the financial origins of this crisis are well understood, there are compounding factors of energy-driven trade deficits, and the effect of high oil prices on tourism.

2.4. United States The oil crises experienced by the United States and other industrial nations during the 1970s resulted in sharp and deep recessions, and contributed to an extended period of economic uncertainty and stagnation. While the specific causes of the crises are superficially similar to the challenges we consider here, they differ in large part in that they were caused by geopolitical factors and thus were immediate but temporary whereas geological factors are likely to be gradual but fundamental. It is for this reason that Hirsch et al. note that “past ‘energy crisis’ experience will provide relatively little guidance” [10]. Nevertheless, they serve as an empirical reminder of the dependency of industrial economies upon energy in general and oil in particular.

2.5. Soviet Union While there are numerous historical examinations of the decline and fall of the Soviet Union, the work by Orlov on this subject is of particular note for its attempt to relate challenges the Soviet Union faced with that of impending challenges faced by today’s industrialized nations [15]. Orlov observes that many of the contributing factors and circumstances from the Soviet Union are present in the United States as well, and thus attempts to distill the ways in which the two differ as much as they share. In particular, he notes both face(d) declining oil production, unsustainable debt, unresponsive political and socioeconomic systems, and military conflict. In the post-collapse environment, he describes widespread social dislocation, shortages of basic commodities, foregone infrastructure maintenance, and the failure of new long term plans. Despite this, he notes that because the economic system was not market-based, a number of crucial sectors of society continued to function either as before or with bearable disruptions: housing, transportation, food production, medicine, education, and energy. In some of these, the Soviet systems were already somewhat dysfunctional but as a result individuals already had coping strategies (e.g. pervasive kitchen gardens); in others, the systems were government-run and thus collapse didn’t affect them (e.g. no foreclosures due to free housing; most transportation was public and supplied by domestic energy).

In contrast, the equivalent systems in free-market economies are both highly efficient but at the same time complex and interdependent; for example, one among many proximate causes of the 2008 economic crisis was the implosion of the housing bubble, which in part was caused by high energy prices which decreased demand for exurban sprawl, a cycle which fed on itself [9]. Thus there is some reason to believe, as Orlov contends, that many of the advantages of efficient free-market economies in times of growth can become disadvantages in times of hardship.

2.6. Undeveloping Regions One remarkable characteristic is that despite the fact that these crises had different origins, took place within different cultures and socioeconomic systems, and with different historical contexts, the effects on their populations were somewhat similar (though by no means the same). Though forecasts are sure to be wrong in their specifics (though perhaps not in their broad contours) the challenges we face are likely not only to be pervasive within nations and long-lasting, but also are likely to affect nations around the world. Thus the crises themselves are likely to interfere with efforts to mitigate them if the planning is postponed. In addition, it is our hope that in anticipating these challenges we both help mitigate them and also inform the design of better systems for not only undeveloping regions, but developing and developed regions as well.

We are not expecting a specific sharp inflection point at which a nation is no longer “developed”, nor are we expecting such a process to occur quickly. Instead, we expect a slow, grinding, and mostly transparent process of undevelopment that, while we expect it to begin this decade, will not fully play out for a few decades to come. Within this context, we also expect natural societal adjustments to respond to these challenges, responses which in some cases might improve circumstances (e.g. energy efficiency programs, relocalized health, education, and food production, etc.) and in some cases might do the opposite (e.g. last ditch efforts to produce liquid fuels from coal, tar sands, etc.).

It is unclear how long lived these challenges will be—will they last on the order of a decade or two, as in these historical examples, or will they be more persistent? Some have argued that the latter is more likely because the limits faced today are fundamental and pervasive [13, 9, 14]. Nevertheless, our goal here isn’t to adjudicate the matter; a decade or two is long enough to warrant our attention. Thus we turn our attention to three categories commonly targeted by ICTD research within which we can categorize the effects of the above historical crises.

Economics. Economic challenges are the clearest common thread in these four examples. In each, financial systems struggled as liquidity vanished and the grip of inflation took hold. As a result, consumer spending plummeted (in free-market economies) and thus both the industrial and service sectors were affected. In many ways, the economic effects appeared to be like a particularly severe recession, but with significantly longer duration.
Health. A prominent concern of the ICTD community has been public health. Peak oil, limits to growth, and climate change together are likely to present perhaps the biggest set of challenges to public health that have ever been faced in modern times [13], so facing these issues head on is a matter of public health in developing and undeveloping regions alike. A likely cause of problems will be the mismatch between today’s expensive and complex industrial medicine and the basic needs and financial means of the populace. A recent issue of the American Journal of Public Health featured eight papers on the special topic of Peak Petroleum and Public Health with a wide array of dire findings and possible mitigation approaches.
Transportation. As we face issues with the cost and availability of oil, and thus of transportation fuels, nations with oil-dependent transportation systems will find themselves hugely vulnerable. In addition, the expense and time commitment to build alternative systems, such as an extensive rail network, are prohibitive during times of crisis, as indicated by Argentina’s experience.

3. Challenges and Responses

Networked systems design, and systems design more broadly, is always about context: about building a system that optimizes some metrics within some design constraints. Thus far we have tried to outline the issues likely to be faced by those in undeveloping regions. Here we attempt to translate such issues into concrete research challenges—constraints within which the community will need to design within and possible responses. The constraints we identify often differ not only from today’s developed regions but from developing ones as well, though the similarities are as interesting as the differences.

Before we begin, we briefly make two disclaimers. First, it is very difficult to know that the constraints we identify are the right ones; only time will tell. We have tried our best to let the case studies and other background material inform them. Second, we are aware of the issue of generalizability—that while it is of value to deliver generalizable contributions in ICTD work, there is a danger of attempting to generalize from specific instances to circumstances that may in fact differ significantly [4].

3.1. A Comparison

Category Developed Regions Developing Regions Undeveloping Regions
Network Infrastructure Pervasive and advanced Spotty but advancing Varied and aging
Devices Contemporary Lagging but advancing Lagging and stagnant
Power Stable and ubiquitous Intermittent Intermittent but varied
Finance Stable and ubiquitous Stable but varied Unstable

A key difference in this challenge versus most ICTD work is that the design is in large part for the (potentially near) future, not today. In an attempt to capture the differences between the well-understood targets of developed and developing regions, and the undeveloping regions of the future, we summarize some qualities that may be pertinent to networked systems designers in the Table. In particular, we contend that undeveloping regions are likely to exhibit the unsurprising quality of slow or absent replacement of infrastructure and devices and general degradation of existing systems. The key difference between undeveloping regions and the developing regions of today is likely to be their starting point—many undeveloping regions may begin with a vast infrastructure and installed base which can serve as a buffer for some time. At the same time, they will be faced with a pervasive dependency on those systems for the functioning of interlinked social systems. Just as there are those in developing regions who are early adopters of ICT, whose combination of local knowledge and technical knowledge can prove important to the success of an ICTD project, there are some, though not many, autochthonous technology communities in developed countries [11], usually with an aim of independence (and sometimes sustainability).

It is just as worthwhile to examine what assumptions may no longer hold for developing regions that transition to undevelopment. Specifically, we contend that two of the three assumptions made in one of the earliest ICTD papers by Brewer et al. will no longer be true for such regions [2]: 1) the impact of Moore’s law is likely to slow or cease, not only due to inherent challenges of scaling today’s technology at prior rates, but also due to the increased relative cost of deploying new technology during increasingly hard economic times; and 2) favorable business environments are, in some regions, likely to be a temporary artifact of global surplus and trade, something that is widely expected to reverse [12, 13, 9].

3.2. Appropriate Technology

Because transportation costs will rise for undeveloping regions, sustainability in networking and ICT will need to become a significant focus. Sustainability in networking helps solve other societal sustainability issues, and the sustainability of networking itself will have to be prioritized. In particular, we advocate the adoption of the principles of “appropriate technology” [8, 18]; namely the design of networked systems that are a) simple, b) locally reproducible, c) composed of local materials and resources, d) easily repairable, e) affordable, and f) easily recyclable. Moreover, many of the resulting objectives are part of the networking canon: to build scalable networks that can be started and tested at a small scale with modest resources, resilient networks that remain useful under changing conditions and respond to pressures, modular networks separated into distinct elements that can be replaced at different scales and technological levels, and open networks that do not demand a certain system or set of components to function. It is however the case that in recent years ICTD research has far more effectively adhered to such maxims than the broader swath of networking research.

3.3. Complexity

In each of the case studies we considered in Section 2, we found that the complexity of the socioeconomic system in question was the root of much of the hardship. That is, each crisis trigger caused a series cascading economic failures. As today much of the economic infrastructure of developed economies relies upon networks and ICT more generally, we can play a direct role in decreasing complexity, or at the very least the impact of complexity. In a sense, our task is to help build resilience in the network of interactions between computing and non-computing systems throughout an economy, just as resilient and secure networks are designed to isolate faults and attacks. Such an effort would also be in line with the principles of Appropriate Technology outlined above.

A first step is to better understand the complexity of today’s networked systems. Ratnasamy began such an investigation by defining a complexity metric with which networked systems could be evaluated [16]; it would be valuable to extend this notion, apply it to better understand complex networked systems, and then expand the analysis to systems built upon them.

3.4. Transparency

One key way to help mitigate the ecological limits being faced is to better understand them, and the tools of networked systems—in particular sensor networks and cyber-physical systems—can be of particular value. Specifically, such systems can provide scientists, engineers, and policy-makers rich databases to enable analysis of local resources (both physical and virtual resources) and their flows. This might enable local communities to realize what substitutable resources they have locally that can replace remotely sourced inputs, and also potentially learn about the ability of their local bioregion to absorb pollution and waste flows in the form of natural sinks. This information can be valuable for energy sources as well (e.g. ICT can help a developing or undeveloping region better understand the rate at which they are depleting the forest for firewood or eroding the topsoil to grow biofuels, and can help understand how sinks like air pollution relate to it). However, such systems are challenging to build because of the scale required, the unreliability of the sources, and the way in which the system will have to operate (i.e. under challenging socioeconomic conditions), which argues for their near-term development.

3.5. Development During Undevelopment

As Burrell and Toyama discuss [4], it is not simply an open question of what ICT looks like in ICTD, but the notion of Development itself. In the context we discuss here, we believe that the notions of development considered most prominently by the ICTD community will naturally have to broaden. While there are researchers considering development in the context of sustainability and other constraints, development in the context of undeveloping regions facing limits to growth will have to be quite different indeed. While the thus-far unstated premise of our paper—that growth and thus development as it is currently perceived and measured is in the process of ending for many if not most regions—may seem like an ideological statement, we contend that our current growth paradigm is the same: implicitly accepted ideology. Indeed the science on the subject indicates that the current paradigm cannot continue, and not in the sense of ethics, but in the sense of hard ecological limits [13, 20, 14].

Thus with the necessary transition away from this paradigm—something that we as computer scientists will likely have little role in—we can embrace those alternative paradigms that have been developed over the last several decades that provide a more productive notion of development in a post-growth era. Specifically there exists a large body of work in the domain of Ecological Economics which we believe can and should inform such thinking, and aligns nicely with the objectives of Appropriate Technology discussed earlier.

4. Conclusions

It is our belief that ICTD research will become and needs to become more central to the mission of networking research if we are to appropriately respond to the converging issues we face. The broader networking community has yet to design systems to operate under such challenging conditions, and targeted to specific and fluctuating circumstances; on the other hand, the ICTD community deals with such challenges frequently and thus has much offer. Regardless of how the issues we explore in this paper develop, infusing the methodology and knowledge of ICTD research throughout the broader community can only yield benefits.


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